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Abstract:
The problem of key management is an information security issue at the core of any
cryptographic protocol where identity is involved (e.g. encryption, digital signature). In
particular for the case of online voting, it is critical to ensure that no single actor (or small
group of colluding actors) can impact the result of the election nor break the secrecy of
the ballot.
The concept of threshold encryption is present at the core of many Multi-Party Com-
putation (MPC) protocols, even more so in the scenario of online voting protocols. On
the other hand, the generic key management problem has led to the design of certifi-
ably secure hardware for cryptographic purposes. There are three families of these kind
of designed for security devices: Hardware Security Modules (HSMs), Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs) and smart cards.
Since smart cards both offer reasonable prices and expose an API for development,
this document evaluates different approaches to implement threshold encryption over
smart cards to support an electoral process.
Keywords: online voting, key management, threshold cryptography, smart cards, un-
trusted dealer
CERCS Code: P170 (Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control)
Kuluefektiivne võtmehaldus elektroonilise hääletamise jaoks
Lühikokkuvõte:
Võtmehaldus on infoturbes tuntud üldine probleem, mis mängib olulist rolli elektroonilise
hääletamise turvalisuse tagamisel. Oluline on tagada, et häälte salajasus ei oleks rikutav
ühe osapoole või väikese rühma koos tegutsevate osapoolte poolt.
Lävikrüptograafia kitsamalt ning mitme osapoolega arvutused laiemalt on olulised
komponendid paljudes elektroonilise hääletamise protokollides. Samal ajal kasutatakse
võtmehalduse probleemi praktiliseks lahendamiseks sageli vastavaks otstarbeks sertifitsee-
ritud ühe osapoolega lahendusi  riistvaralised turvamoodulid, kiipkaardid, TPM-kiibid.
Töös hindame kiipkaartide kui kuluefektiivsete ja laiendatavate komponentide kasuta-
mise võimalikkust võtmehaldusprobleemi lahendamiseks elektroonilise hääletamise jaoks
lävikrüptograafia meetodite abil.
Võtmesõnad: elektrooniline hääletamine, võtmehaldus, lävikrüptograafia, kiipkaardid
CERCS: P170
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1 Introduction
This thesis describes the design process of a solution to enable key storage that can be
used to hold legally binding electoral processes.
The use of information technologies to support elections enables voting processes to
provide proofs of transparency to voters that are more reliable than any traditional
system, at the expense of clarity: the level of previous knowledge required to
understand the nature and reliability of a cryptographic model is higher and more
specific than it would be for paper ballot, to name an example.
As it is to be expected, the implementation of cryptographic protocols for the specific
scenario of electronic voting inherits all the concerns that need to be addressed for any
cryptographic implementation: e.g. the selection of suitable parameters and the specific
algorithms, the decision of using well-proven libraries against implementing the
algorithms from scratch, identifying a suitable randomness generator and extracting
randomness from it adequately, or protecting the secret key used in the algorithm.
The latter will be the major problem addressed during this work. The present
document will explore the problem of key storage in general, and its particularities
within the online voting scenario. It analyzes the viability of introducing threshold
encryption schemes using smart cards as a platform for security critical operations. As
a mechanism to validate the approach proposed, this document evaluates its suitability
within the Estonian Internet Voting scheme, which has been used for legally binding
elections throughout more than a decade.
This document presents an overview of the general problem of key management on
chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the specific key management requirements within an
online voting scenario, using the experience of the Estonian Internet Voting scheme as a
use case. A qualitative framework for comparing key management strategies and a
viability analysis of alternatives comprise the chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes
the results obtained and introduces a wide range of questions that can lead future
research in related areas.
Although this document is directed to an audience familiar with cryptography and/or
voting systems, it does not assume any prior knowledge in terms of specific notation or
concepts. In that regard, the annexes provide a guide about specific terminology used in
the document. Annex A lists mathematical symbols and variable names, annex B
expands all the acronyms of technologies, techniques and institutions, whereas annex C
contains a short introduction to essential cryptographic primitives.
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2 Overview
The definition of a cryptographic primitive is typically represented as a network
protocol, where the communication channel is hostile and the parties, conventionally
labeled as Alice and Bob, are trustworthy. In some cases, the idea that the other actors
can deliberately attempt to deviate from the protocol is acknowledged and modeled.
For simplicity in some cases, and for necessity in others, these models rely upon certain
assumptions. Ignoring their existence leads to some of the least evident and most
harmful bugs and vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations.
There are two major assumptions that support the majority of the functionality in
cryptographic primitives:
1. It is possible to choose an element from an arbitrary set at random with uniform
probability (true randomness).
2. Any actor in a cryptographic protocol is a deterministic black box that can keep a
secret and only discloses the information determined by the protocol.
In particular, the second assumption implies veiled requirements that cannot be met by
any implementation. What is Alice? Is it the user making use of the system, or is it the
computer, or the program running on top? How can Alice be trusted to follow the
protocol? What happens when several copies of secret data (key, password, etc.) are
made? How can a secret key be kept secret?
As a key is a kind of secret that is critical for several cryptographic primitives, these
questions lead to the concept of key management. It consists of following the lifecycle of
a key in order to enable its availability while protecting its secrecy and integrity. The
objective of this section is to describe the importance of key management, the threats
that it must overcome and the existing approaches to the problem.
2.1 Importance of Cryptographic Keys
A cryptographic scheme in the malicious model can offer meaningful guarantees of
security to Alice if Alice is honest. The honesty of Alice is typically described as her
adherence to the protocol. However, modern cryptographic protocols with non-trivial
security parameters cannot be executed correctly and efficiently by a human mind.
Alice does not execute the protocol directly, but through a proxy, an information
system. In that scenario, the moral requirement of honesty becomes a technical one.
If Alice is technically honest, she will follow the protocol rigorously up to every
constraint: correct ordering of the messages will be observed, the variables will be
chosen within the given range, the calculations will be performed accurately and every
nondeterministic action will be as nondeterministic as possible. From the functional
point of view, correctness is enough.
However, from the information security point of view, correctness is not sufficient. Since
the main objective of cryptographic protocols is to enforce specific restrictions (e.g.
only Alice can read the content, the tally can be generated only by the electoral
committee), it is also important for any statement to ensure that no information is
leaked beyond the intended functionality.
In particular, the identity of Alice is usually represented by a secret piece of data: a key.
In cryptographic protocols, the security of the key can determine the security
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boundaries of the system. However, said importance is seldom accounted for within the
design of the protocol. In the context of most cryptographic definitions, the key is
generated according to certain constraints (e.g. a random element in Zp) and then
stored in a secure void, where it can be accessed when it is required by the protocol.
There is, nevertheless, no secure void within an information system. A key is a string of
bits that needs to be stored and retrieved to working memory and needs to be backed
up to withstand physical failure. A key is a physical entity that can exist in different
places at the same time. It is also intended to be the only obstacle for an adversary
attempting an attack within an otherwise secure protocol. In short: a cryptographic
protocol implementation is only as strong as the protection around its key material.
The security of a strong cryptographic protocol is bounded by the weakest path to any
copy of the secret key. The repertoire of attack vectors that aim to recover the secret
key within an encryption system is rich and diverse.
2.2 Attacks Vectors for Key Retrieval
There is active research about how to break keys whose security relies on mathematical
assumptions. For instance, since a private RSA key can be obtained by factoring the
public key, improving factoring can be a way to break the system. However, there are
no efficient algorithms for factoring so far, and therefore RSA is still secure as a scheme
(given the right choice of parameters).
On the other hand, the implementations of cryptographic functions are seldom as
careful and isolated as their mathematical models. Bugs, malpractice and unexpected
variables reduce the difficulty of guessing a key. This section describes different attack
vectors that leverage this fact.
2.2.1 No Randomness
The difference between encoding and encryption may be subtle, but essential. An
encoded message can be decoded by anyone who knows (or can derive) the rules. There
is no secret key. An encrypted message, on the other hand, can only be decrypted
(theoretically) by the holder of the key. A similar logic applies for other keyed
primitives, such as MAC integrity checks.
It is a common anti-pattern to hard-code a default constant value within the code of an
application in order to use it as a secret key. If the key used within an encryption
scheme is not random and cannot be changed easily, the encryption scheme is being
used for encoding. If a software product uses it as a key, its retrieval is, at best, as hard
as reverse engineering the application.
2.2.2 Poor Randomness
Any keyed algorithm relies at least once on the random generation of a value k
extracted from the universe of values K with nearly uniform probability. In other
words, that
(
∀k∗ ∈ K : Pr[k = k∗] ≈ 1|K|
)
.
The definition of what is random is elusive, although there are tests to assess the
randomness of a string. For this reason, the difference between randomness that is good
enough for a simulation or the decisions in a game and randomness suitable for
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cryptographic use is often subtle and not properly analyzed. The use of poor random
generators for cryptographic purposes has been repeatedly documented.
From the deliberate construction of backdoors [1] to API misuse [2], the usage of
random number generators that are not random enough is a major problem in present
day cryptographic implementations [3].
Furthermore, without access to a true randomness source, a good randomness function,
i.e. a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) a seed
is required: a value that initializes the CSPRNG. The CSPRNG is, after initialization,
deterministic: given a seed, the string of random values produced will always be the
same. Examples of bad seeds are a constant integer or a function of the system time,
and yet the most remarkable mistake regarding seeds is repetition: to use the same seed
in two instances of the CSPRNG. One scenario is the non-random presetting of a key:
choosing an arbitrary but fixed seed defeats its purpose. Another, more subtle
alternative appears when the seed is derived from network, physical and software
parameters, since these parameters do not have enough variance/randomness to act as
an acceptable seed.
In both cases, the choice of a weak seed will lead to different independent systems
inadvertently sharing keys and the possibility for attackers to calculate it themselves.
2.2.3 Access Control
Access control is, after cryptography, the most efficient family of controls to ensure
confidentiality and integrity requirements. It is possible to define a flexible set of actors,
actions, assets and permissions to model fine grained policies.
Unlike cryptography, access control is not applied directly on the protected asset, but on
its containers: e.g. operating systems, physical facilities, application servers or network
infrastructure. As a result, if access control is overridden, the protected asset is exposed.
Even under the assumption of a flawless implementation of access control mechanisms,
its configuration is neither static nor trivial. As a result, its maintenance becomes a
highly demanding operational task that is likely to be neglected when it interrupts the
execution of more productive ones. In other words: business continuity is likely to
antagonize access control, deteriorating over time the accuracy with which access
control rules reflect the business rules, diminishing its effectiveness as a control.
Another security limitation of access control schemes is that they can fail silently. For
example, a firewall that is not filtering packages will work as well as one that only
accepts authorized requests as long as only authorized requests are sent.
As a result, relying on access control mechanisms to protect a private key can be
considered a good practice, albeit insufficient. The key can be leaked inadvertently and
the policies might even allow access to another existent but unauthorized user (i.e.
escalation of privileges).
2.2.4 Application Vulnerabilities
Even when a cryptographic algorithm is secure according to a mathematical model, its
implementation requires interaction with existing technologies and their limitations:
response times, APIs, data types, abstractions, frameworks and legacy applications. As
a result, the vulnerabilities of the underlying technology are inherited by the
implementation and need to be addressed or accepted. For example, a cryptographic
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library in C needs to acknowledge the possibility of buffer overflow attacks and prevent
information leakage by exploitation of the same.
One of the biggest recent examples of the extent to which application dependencies can
lead to major security incidents is the vulnerability CVE-2014-0160, publicly known as
Heartbleed. The vulnerability affected OpenSSL, a major open source library for SSL
support. Under certain conditions, the bug enabled the remote recovery of server side
information, including in some scenarios the secret key of the server. The number of
vulnerable Internet servers varies according to the measurement criteria, but the
vulnerability existed for years before being revealed and affected a vast amount of the
most visited websites on the Internet [4].
Heartbleed is not the only internet-wide major vulnerability disclosed in the last years,
and the fact that it remained undiscovered for so long reveals how subtle and critical
the security assessment of an application can be.
2.2.5 Poor Protection of Multiple Copies
It is not realistic to assume that there is one single instance of a cryptographic key that
can be used arbitrarily and safely without moving it or copying it. In a real computer,
the key can be stored in secondary storage. When it is needed, a copy is generated in
main memory. Furthermore, the requirements of availability may lead to store backups
of the key in different information systems (either cold or hot backup). Finally, for
practical or economical reasons, the same key can be used for different solutions that
implement a variety of protocols.
Since each copy of the key is identical, each of them has exactly the same value. For
instance, a digital document can be signed with any of the copies of the key with
exactly the same validity. The main impact of this remark is the fact that the key is
only as secure as the most vulnerable of its containers.
If the key is stored in an encrypted hard drive, but it is not deleted from RAM once it
is used, it may be easier for an attacker to dump the RAM than to decrypt the content
of the disk. Likewise, if the cold backup is stored in a warehouse that is only secured
with a lock, it will be easier for an attacker to steal that copy and leave no digital trace
of the theft.
2.2.6 Malpractice
One of the least obvious consequences of implementing a cryptographic protocol in a
computer is that other processes, unrelated to the protocol itself, can jeopardize the key
to the point of making the whole solution superfluous.
The security malpractices that can leak the key are diverse in nature, propensity and
exploitability. Failure to erase the key from a hard drive that is being disposed of
enables a dumpster diver to access the key.
Additional examples of poor security practices include negligent access control
configuration (e.g. chmod 777 in Unix systems, used as a way to debug errors related to
system permissions), unsafe transmission of the key material or inadvertent publication
in a public repository.
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2.2.7 Side Channel Attacks
The field of side channel attacks is the result of the realization that every cryptographic
primitive is executed within a physical machine that may be used for more than a single
purpose. As a result, it assesses the implications of that observation in terms of the
security of that primitive. The possibility of retrieving a cryptographic key from the
analysis of the temperature, power consumption or environmental noise defies the
validity of the abstraction in which computer scientists work. When security is involved,
a black box that follows a protocol deliberately omits details that can falsify any
security assertion.
Furthermore, the analysis of the effects of concurrency, processing scheduling, latency
and shared memory, among other characteristics of modern computational
environments, provides additional information to adversaries that cannot be fully
predicted by mathematical models.
The possibility of attacking the underlying system that implements a cryptographic
primitive to break its security is a latent and inherently chaotic threat that needs to be
addressed as part of a cryptographic implementation.
2.3 Key Storage Solutions
The variety and subtlety of attack vectors on a key do not imply that the key is
inexorably exposed and that all keyed cryptographic primitives are insecure. It does
imply, however, that key management is a critical issue and the decisions made around
it may impact the security claims made about the whole system.
This section explores solutions to the problem of key storage and the guarantees that
can be offered by each of them.
2.3.1 Cleartext
A cryptographic key can be represented in a file. One of the most commonly used
representations for that is the ASN.1 notation. ASN.1 is typically used to encode the
attributes of a cryptographic key in a multiplatform, standardized way. A file that is
encoded correctly can be copied, transmitted and read like any other file within the file
system.
This representation is, however, insufficient for the storage of secret data. A cleartext
key can be leaked or tampered with trivially, and the detection of any compromise is
unlikely, even in the long term. Although the implementation of file system access
control measures can reduce the attack surface, this representation is still too
vulnerable against experienced attackers.
2.3.2 PKCS#12
The Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) define the parameters for encoding
cryptographic material used for public key schemes, including certificates, revocation
lists, certificate signing requests and private keys. In particular, the standard PKCS#12
defines the concept of a keystore. The standard is also described in RFC 7292 [5]. A
single keystore may contain different entries, identified by a string knows as alias.
One of the features that differentiate a keystore as the container of sensitive material
from a normal binary file is the definition of several privacy and integrity modes [5].
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As a result, the transmission and storage of personal identity information (i.e.
cryptographic keys and associated information) can be protected with a password
derived key or another key pair.
Although it is theoretically the most powerful option, the use of another key pair just
transfers the problem, since the new key will also need protection. As a result, the
popular implementations of the protocol (in particular, it is the default mechanism for
the retrieval of a private key from the major Internet browsers and operating systems)
favor the use of password protected keystores.
As a general idea, a password is used in the PKCS#12 standard to derive a symmetric
encryption key. However, the standard offers different levels of granularity, which may
or may not use the same password. The first separation occurs between privacy and
integrity: the encryption and MAC algorithms might use the same password, or require
two different. Furthermore, in addition to global level passwords, it is possible to
establish passwords specific for each entry in the keystore.
Although the use of key derivation functions reduces the viability of password guessing
attacks, the use of passwords enables usability malpractices that can lead to a leak of
the private key. Some of the pitfalls, enunciated by [6] more than a decade ago and still
present in the industry, lead to the conclusion that no security critical decision should
be left to the discretion of the final user, if it can be avoided. Some examples were the
reuse of the same key in different environments or sending the password along with the
keystore.
Another specific scenario involves access to the key material by an automated process.
Be it a server that supports SSL communication, or an application compatible with
PGP, the problem appears when asking the user every time for the password is not
feasible or makes no sense for the specific process. The storage of the password becomes
necessary but problematic. As a result, the password is stored in locations that are not
designed to store sensitive information, such as a shell script that calls the encryption
process, or an unprotected text file. In general, a password has the same limitations and
privacy requirements as a cryptographic key, with the additional issue of being human
readable, and could therefore be leaked in unexpected ways. Section 6 of RFC 7292
states just that limitation and suggests guidelines to maximize the effectiveness of
password based protection.
It must also be noted that the PKCS family focuses on containers and definitions for
public key encryption material, and thus could be unsuitable for the storage of other
kinds of cryptographic material.
2.3.3 Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a purpose-specific processor designed to support
cryptographic operations in general purpose computers, standardized by ISO-11889 [7].
Along with security controls against unauthorized use and cryptographic support, its
architecture supports random number generation and key storage.
The TPM is designed to isolate the storage and usage of cryptographic material, as well
as the randomness generation, from the data and instructions, reducing the possibility
of key leakage due to API misuse. Given its increasing presence in consumer products,
it is used to support cryptographic functionality such as BitLocker, the application for
Full Disk Encryption available in recent Windows versions.
The most recent version of TPM, 2.0, enables support for the most common
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cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA, SHA-1, SHA-256 and elliptic curve. However,
no specific algorithm is mandatory. In terms of physical portability, a TPM is as
portable as the computing system that contains it.
2.3.4 Smart Cards
Smart cards are very limited computing devices that rely on a card reader as a power
and communication source. Although they are not designed to enable intensive
operations (neither in terms of time nor space), they often include built-in support of
standard cryptographic primitives. As a result, they are a popular, portable and
isolated environment for the storage and usage of cryptographic keys.
The standard ISO/IEC 7816 [8] defines the features of contact, contactless and hybrid
smart cards, and their cryptographic capabilities are often certified to some level of the
FIPS 140-2 standard [9]. As a consequence, smart cards are used as a strong
authentication mechanism. On the other hand, their functionality is neither scalable
nor very flexible, and their portability enables non-conventional attack vectors, mainly
within the realm of side channel attacks.
A popular development platform for smart cards is Java Card, which is designed as a
subset of the Java language for resource constrained devices. Although it shares its
syntax with Java, Java Card suffers from a limited API and extremely limited storage
and processing power. It is designed to support classical cryptographic algorithms, such
as AES, RSA and the SHA hash family. However, it does not offer support for
homomorphic encryption schemes, including ElGamal. An application developed for
Java Card is known as an applet.
2.3.5 Hardware Security Modules (HSM)
A stronger instance of the separation between cryptographic and business operations is
known as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). An HSM is an appliance that
implements tamper-evident and tamper-resistant mechanisms around an
application-specific cryptographic computer.
HSMs are considered one of the most efficient mechanisms for the secure storage and
usage of cryptographic material, supporting the operation of critical processes such as
online banking, military communications or the operation of a certification authority.
They are subject to strict security certifications, of which FIPS 140-2 [9] is the most
prevalent. The modules include mechanisms that enable high availability, secure key
backup and efficient encryption.
Despite being recognized in the industry as the most powerful option, HSMs are not
cost efficient for every critical process, even when the information being protected is
highly sensitive. Furthermore, very few HSMs enable customized functionality, and the
ones that do are even more expensive. As a result, the search for cheaper ways to
obtain similar levels of assurance and greater levels of customization becomes an
important research field.
2.4 Secret Sharing and Threshold Encryption
The approach for key protection described up to this point is to treat a key as a single
point of failure. If there are several copies of the key, each of them is critical, since the
leak of any of them compromises the security of the system as a whole, regardless of the
13
controls implemented around the other copies. In this section, the aim is to distribute
the risk so that, if the controls around one copy are compromised, the security of the
system remains resilient.
The most popular approach in this direction is Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme [10],
remarkable as a cryptographic scheme that is both practical and
information-theoretically secure. In this approach, the key is split into shares that can
be used to reconstruct the key later on.
This approach introduces two concepts: secret sharing and threshold.
A secret sharing scheme involves two phases: the generation of the shares and the
reconstruction phase. For the generation of the shares, two parameters are defined: the
number of shares n and the threshold t. The shares are generated from a secret s and
distributed among different trustees. The reconstruction phase allows the calculation of
s if and only if at least t shares are available. After the reconstruction phase, the secret
is no longer shared.
The selection of the values t and n depends on each specific scenario, strongly
determined by its practical constraints. How many trustees will receive a share? Should
one trustee receive more shares than another? Which is the minimum amount of
trustees required to perform the threshold reconstruction? It is essential to note that
different choices for these values will result in different implications.
A high threshold will reduce liability in the case where few shares are compromised or a
group of the trustees collude. If more shares are required (i.e. if t is bigger), a collusion
or an attack will need to compromise a wider attack surface. On the other hand, if the
threshold is too close to the total number of shares, the integrity and availability of the
key is jeopardized. In the extreme case, if n = t, it would suffice to lose or corrupt one
share to make the system unusable.
Threshold schemes, thus, offer resilience or security, but for most reasonable values,
these features constitute a trade-off.
2.4.1 Shamir's Secret Sharing
As mentioned earlier, Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme is one of the first and most
popular secret sharing schemes [10]. Given a secret value s ∈ Zp, it produces a set
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S = {S1, ..., Sn} as follows:
Algorithm 1: Shamir.SecretSharing
input : s, t, n
output: a, S
1 a0 ← s;
2 for i← 1 to t− 1 do
3 ai
$←− Zp ; // Create [t] random coefficients
4 for i← 1 to n do
5 xi ← getX(i) ; // Creates a value of [x] for the [i]-th share
// Polynomial evaluation:
6 yi ← a0;
7 for j ← 1 to t− 1 do
8 yi ← si + aj · xji
9 si ← (xi, yi)
10 a← a0, ..., at−1;
11 S ← s1, ..., sn
The only requirement for the function getX(i) is to produce different values in Zp for
different inputs of i. In particular, defining getX(i) = i is acceptable. As a result, the
indexes can be public.
A set S ′ = {S ′1, ..., S ′t} such that S ′ ⊆ S can be used to reconstruct the secret s using
Lagrange interpolation as follows:
Shamir.SecretReconstruction(S ′ = (X ′, Y ′)) = s = L(0) =
k∑
j=0
Y ′j
k∏
m=0,m 6=j
X ′m
X ′m −X ′j
(1)
2.4.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
In the basic Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the trust in the dealer is absolute: the
trusted parties receive values in Zp that are indiscernible from random. The definition
of the scheme ensures that a group of at least k parties will be able to produce a secret
s∗, but there is no way to prove to the shareholders that s = s∗.
This is particularly critical when the secret is to be used as the private key of an
encryption scheme. If the dealer creates a key pair (sk, pk), publishes pk and then
distributes n random values in Zp instead of correctly calculated shares, all the
messages encrypted using pk will be lost, since (with overwhelming probability) those
shares will not produce the value sk. In the case of a voting process, the error could
only be detected after the election is over and all the votes would be lost.
The approach to reduce the impact of this observation is known as Verifiable Secret
Sharing (VSS)[11]. The aim of VSS is to ensure consistency by verifying that the shares
are not randomly chosen values. In the case of the key pair, the objective is to prove
that an arbitrary share si is a valid share for the secret key sk. In particular, this
validation should be possible without requiring access to the other shares, disclosure the
value sk nor initiation of the reconstruction process.
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The models for VSS vary depending upon the nature of the secret. For instance, in the
case of a key pair (sk, pk), the relationship between the secret sk and the public value
pk can be used to prove properties of sk without revealing its value. The scope of VSS
is defined in [12] in two points:
1. Prevent a malicious dealer from distributing incorrect shares to the participants
(i.e. send s∗ 6∈ S, where S =SecretSharing(s) for an arbitrary secret s).
2. Prevent a malicious trusted party from contributing with an incorrect share to
SecretReconstruction (i.e. for a user i, to send s∗ 6= si).
2.4.3 Distributed Key Generation
VSS is an important building block in threshold cryptography, but its functional
purpose is unclear until it is looked at in the context of Distributed Key Generation
(DKG). The goal of DKG is to securely distribute shares of a secret key among
authorized users. The exact extent of the term securely depends on the different
scenarios considered. Specifically, the security model depends on the existence or
absence of a trusted dealer.
If there is a trusted dealer, its function is to create the secret value and distribute its
shares using a VSS scheme. If there is no trusted dealer, each of the trusted parties
contributes to the calculation of a shared secret. An example of a DKG protocol
without a trusted dealer is discussed in section 4.4.2.
2.5 Cryptography and E-Voting
This section shifts the perspective from key management to the other end of the
problem of this thesis: online voting. The description of voting as an information
security problem shares so many elements with the description of a Multi-Party
Computation (MPC) protocol that both research areas are intricately entangled and the
results of one often are a generalization (or an instance) of the other.
A voting process involves a simple objective, the aggregation of the points of view of a
group of valid voters into a measurable result (the tally). Given a set of previously
defined rules, the functional side of the solution is not likely to pose a hard engineering
challenge. The security of the process, however, is complicated by a diverse set of actors
who, guided by a wide range of motivations, may collude to influence the value of the
tally.
Each of the entities involved in a voting process has the right or the duty of fulfilling a
particular role in the process. For example, the voters may cast a vote, the registration
authority must issue identities and the tallying authority has to aggregate the values of
the votes cast. However, each of the parties might be willing to exceed their influence in
the process, and therefore each of them has reason to mistrust the others.
When the dynamics of the process lead to requirements that seem to be contradictory
(such as ballot secrecy and verifiability), the attempts to satisfy them call for the use of
specialized cryptographic approaches. The techniques, thoroughly documented in [13],
include homomorphic encryption, mix-nets, blind signatures, Zero Knowledge Proofs
and commitments.
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2.5.1 Availability of Technology
It is important to remark that while there is broad support of cryptographic
functionality, both in the form of APIs and end user products, said support is focused
on the protection of the world driven by content and multimedia that represents the
majority of all Internet traffic.
A survey on encryption products was published in February 2016 by a team led by the
researcher Bruce Schneier [14]. Although the researchers themselves acknowledge that
the content might be incomplete or inaccurate (the research relied on crowdsourcing as
one of the sources for the data), the survey aims to reflect the main trends in terms of
cryptography implementations. The survey identifies 865 solutions that range from
incipient projects to mature corporate solutions, enabling encryption in different
categories, including file encryption, secure file transfer, email and IM encryption,
cryptographic libraries, secure calling and decentralized Internet tools (anonymizers,
cryptocurrencies, onion browsing, proxies, etc.). None of them involves explicitly
Multi-Party Computation or Zero Knowledge Proofs 1. There are two open source C++
projects that claim to support homomorphic operations. One of them is labeled by its
authors as mostly meant for researchers[15].
In particular, there are no broadly accepted and tested implementations. While modern
programming languages have native API to support cryptographic operations (e.g. Java
Cryptography Architecture) and libraries like BouncyCastle [16] and OpenSSL [17] are
widely used, tested and maintained, implementations related to MPC functionality are
scarce and mostly proofs of concept, which means that they are not designed to be used
securely in production environments.
There are implementations of MPC across the world, but the fact that they are not
identified under the spotlight of such a broad survey suggests that the knowledge is very
centralized and inaccessible.
1Three of the products use the term zero knowledge while describing what is commonly known as
end-to-end encryption. There is no reference to Zero Knowledge Proofs associated with them.
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3 Key Management in the Estonian Internet Voting
Process
The objective of this document is to present a key management scheme suitable for
electronic voting. As a study case, it examines the case of Estonian Internet Voting,
which has been used as a valid channel for casting legally binding votes since 2005 [18].
3.1 Internet Voting in Estonia
Since its introduction in 2005 the adoption of online voting in Estonia has been slow,
but is steadily increasing. During the European Parliament Elections of 2014 and the
National Parliamentary Elections of 2015, more than 30% of the votes were cast via this
channel.
The main characteristic of the Estonian model is that elections are held over the
Internet, as opposed to an event held within controlled venues2. That design choice
implies the need of a carefully defined security model, comprising both strong
mathematical tools and security procedures. In fact, given that the reliability of the
model depends on the right selection and interaction of complex tools, as opposed to
simple concepts such as ballot recounting, there have been evaluators who are not
satisfied with the Estonian model [19].
One of the measures that can be taken to address the criticisms is to ensure that the
technical implementation is as faithful to the proven security models as possible. Within
this approach, the protection of the secret key material becomes a critical aspect.
3.1.1 Current Status of Internet Voting
The Estonian identification card gives every citizen two certified key pairs for
authentication and document signature. This mechanism enables the creation of a
secure channel with bidirectional strong authentication between organizations and
individuals, in order to enable security controls for important services such as online
banking or Internet voting.
The existing implementation of Internet voting in Estonia uses pure public key
encryption and digital signatures in a double envelope scheme. Since 2013, a mechanism
for out of band cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast vote verification has been
implemented on top of the existing system, introducing a mobile application for
verification, independent of the core voting system by design Heiberg and Willemson
[18].
The vote is protected by a scheme known as double envelope. The scheme defines two
independent layers of encapsulation for the vote. For the Estonian implementation, the
inner layer is the the value of the vote encrypted with RSA-OAEP using the public key
of the voting authority. The outer layer is the signature of the encrypted message, using
the signature key of the identification card of the voter. The two layers are processed
sequentially by different components of the system. Once all the votes are cast, one
server verifies the signature of the votes, removes it from the message and sends the
votes, now merely encrypted, to the device in charge of the decryption of the messages.
Currently, the decryption device is a Safenet Luna SA HSM.
2The possibility of paper voting at a precinct is also available in Estonia, but is considered as an
entirely different voting channel.
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3.1.2 Need for Stronger Controls
The Estonian Internet Voting system is simple by design. It can be explained to
non-technical voters by analogy to voting by physical mail and there are no black box
procedures that would generate suspicion. Although it requires a strong technical
background, the implementation details, including the source code, are publicly
available for audit. However, there are still attack vectors that can be exploited.
One remarkable example is the removal of the two envelopes. In principle, there are two
servers srv1, srv2. srv1 receives a batch of votes, each of them of the form
Sigvoter(Encauthority(vote)). It verifies and stripes the signature from the votes.
Afterwards, it sends to srv2 the encrypted votes as a set of elements of the form
Encauthority(vote).
If only srv2 has the secret key skauthority, srv1 can only verify the signatures without
learning the value of vote. If srv2 receives only encrypted votes without a signature, it
cannot track a specific vote back to a voter.
However, if there is a channel between srv1 and srv2, the cooperation between the two
servers can break the secrecy of the ballot. A mix network can be implemented to
mediate the communication between srv1 and srv2 while hindering this attack vector.
In a broader sense, a voting scheme needs to employ non-conventional cryptographic
techniques to defend against certain attack vectors that cannot be ruled out within a
voting scenario. This document focuses on the impact of that fact in the problem of key
management.
3.2 Current Approach to Key Management
The current infrastructure of the Estonian Internet Voting system relies on an HSM for
decryption, in the role of srv2. Before the election, the election officials are given
hardware tokens. After all the votes are cast, the officials connect the tokens to the
HSM and, employing a threshold secret sharing scheme, the votes are decrypted using
traditional RSA-OAEP. The secret key is only used during the tallying phase of the
process, but the secrecy of the ballot (specifically, the link between the identity of a
voter and their vote) must be guaranteed for a long term.
The functionality of the HSM is very well defined, and subject to rigorous certification
processes [20, 21]. However, the security guarantees for the key come at the cost of
flexibility. As a result, the functionality that can be implemented is very restricted.
On the other hand, for several security critical processes the cost of acquisition and
maintenance of an HSM can be hard to justify. Even more so when the process
produces no income to cover its operational costs.
The search of more cost effective alternatives to protect cryptographic keys for online
voting schemes is the main motivation for the present work.
3.3 Scale in Estonian Internet Voting
The size of a nation-wide election is an important factor, even though Estonian
population is relatively small. In particular, the number of candidates and voters may
vary significantly between elections. Local elections often feature more candidates,
whereas at a country level the amount of voters is the predominant value.
8 elections have been held in Estonia supporting Internet Voting as a voting channel.
The last 5 have registered at least 100.000 Internet votes each. The elections for
19
European Parliament in 2015 in Estonia listed 88 candidates. There were almost
900.000 eligible voters, of which nearly 177.000 cast their votes online [22]. During the
local elections of 2013, for the Tartu City Council election alone the number of
candidates went up as high as 437 [23].
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4 Solution Design
The scenario of online voting introduces a series of trade-offs. Between security and
enfranchisement, between different security requirements, between security and
efficiency, and so on. Since security is often one of the most critical and ubiquitous
requirements in dispute, this section aims to define parameters to enable a comparison
between key management strategies. After defining these parameters, three solutions for
key management in online voting scenarios are proposed.
As described in section 3.1.1, the Estonian Internet Voting system relies on a double
envelope model, where the innermost envelope, which contains the encrypted-only vote,
is decrypted by an HSM. The following table presents the main security features of the
current HSM-based approach to key management in the Estonian Internet Voting
System, as well as additional features that can strengthen the security offered by the
system:
Parameter Description
HSM functionality3
Asymmetric algorithms Batch decryption of votes, currently using
RSA. Support for standard ElGamal
Random Number Generation FIPS 140-2 approved DRBG (SP 800-90
CTR mode)
Level of tamper controls Tamper evident, tamper resistant
Security certifications FIPS 140-2 Level 3 [20], Common Criteria
EAL 4 (augmented) [21]
MTBF4 66561 hours
Access control Threshold USB tokens
Scalability The scheme is able to support a nation-wide
voting process for the Estonian system, ac-
counting for its consistently growing adop-
tion (see section 3.3)
Desired additional functionality
Homomorphic encryption support Additive homomorphic encryption protocols
relying on standard security assumptions
(e.g. Lifted ElGamal, Paillier, Damgård-
Jurik)
Zero Knowledge Proofs Sigma protocols
4.1 Key Management Quality Assessment
The confidentiality of a cryptographic key is harder to formalize than the confidentiality
of raw data because it is at the end of the chain of assumptions. An encryption
3According to the official functionality described in [24]
4Mean Time Between Failures. Standard availability measure
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algorithm, for instance, is secure under a particular definition if a set of conditions hold.
One of them is the confidentiality of the key. If the key was treated as raw data and
encrypted, then there would be another key that would need protection itself, just
propagating the problem.
As a result, the comparison between key management strategies requires the definition
of its potentially relevant properties. There are good practices defined for certain
scenarios, but there is no mature framework to compare different features. This section
will propose a definition of such a framework, at least within the scope of cryptographic
protocols for online voting.
4.1.1 Trusted Computing Base
In information security the term Trusted Computing Base (TCB) refers to a set of
components of a system that need to be assumed as flawless, both in terms of
functionality and security, in order to be able to build a security model on top of it. It
is inherent to the problem: if not even the basic operations of a processor can be
trusted, it is impossible to verify that the system implemented actually behaves as it
was designed.
For the purpose of this document, the hardware designed specifically for cryptographic
functionality (i.e. TPMs, HSMs, smart cards) will be assumed to be within the scope of
the TCB. The operations supported by these devices are assumed to work exactly as
described and the storage space can only be accessed by an authorized party.
The scope within which the trustworthiness of said devices can actually be held depends
on the specific device, and can only be supported by means of a thorough evaluation.
For example, the standard FIPS 140-2 defines requirements for cryptographic modules
with extensive coverage of tamper protections: evidence, resistance and reaction. There
is an extensive offer of cryptographic devices certified at some level defined by FIPS
140-2.
In particular, the implementation of cryptographic functionality within said
cryptographic hardware is expected to be designed to resist against known side channel
attacks.
4.1.2 Lifecycle of the Key
The attack surface around the key is determined by its lifecycle. By characterizing the
generation, transmission, storage, usage and destruction of the key, it is possible to
describe more accurately the ways in which the key can be retrieved, and therefore
identify how it could be exploited by an adversary. The following criteria are proposed
to define the lifecycle of a cryptographic key:
Phase Feature Description Attribute
Key generation Random number
generation
The key is generated us-
ing as a parameter the ran-
domness generated by a
CSPRNG or a true random
number generator.
Confidentiality
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Key generation Verifiable
correctness
of generator
The key is generated ac-
cording to the parameters of
the algorithm and the cor-
rect generation can be at-
tested.
Confidentiality
Transport Encrypted
transport
Any communication of sens-
itive material (i.e. key
or randomness) beyond the
boundaries of the TCB.
Confidentiality,
Integrity
Usage Access control It is possible to define
roles and authorized actions
around the key. The rules
can be provably enforced.
Confidentiality
Usage The key cannot
be used by an
unauthorized
actor or group
No operation (e.g. encryp-
tion, decryption) can use
the key if it is triggered
by an unauthorized actor or
group.
Confidentiality
Storage Tampering pro-
tection
The key cannot be modified
(i.e. replaced by another
key or destroyed) by an un-
authorized actor or group.
Integrity
Storage Resilience The key can be used
after the failure or non-
availability of parts of the
TCB.
Integrity
Key destruction The key can
be destroyed
irreversibly
It must not be possible to
use or retrieve any copy of
the key.
Confidentiality
The main idea of these criteria is to remark that obtaining the key is not the only way
to break its security. Any aspect of the scheme that leads to calculate the key,
non-negligibly reduce the key space or produce a valid encryption is equally critical to
the security of the system and needs to be prevented.
Within the scope of this document, this framework is qualitative. The security of the
key management strategy can be described in terms of the parameters presented, but no
quantitative measure of security is produced from it.
4.2 Design Option 1: Replacing the HSM with Smart Cards
Summary: While the process remains unchanged, the decryption of the votes is
supported by smart cards instead of an HSM. A threshold decryption scheme would
enhance the decentralization of the model.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2
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Description: there is a breach between the models for usage and security of an HSM
and the ones of a smart card. HSMs are mechanisms designed to be a centralized
system that can be accessed by different users with different clearance levels. As a
result, they support strong access control techniques, such as threshold secret sharing.
On the other hand, smart cards are intended for personal usage and possession is
already assumed to be a proof of authorization. In some cases additional controls such
as PIN codes are in place, but they do not support any kind threshold schemes natively.
Threshold schemes are paramount to certify that no single individual has too much
power within an election.
In particular, there are threshold decryption schemes (based on VSS with untrusted
dealer) for public key encryption systems such as RSA[25], ElGamal[26] and Paillier[27].
One of the simplest schemes involves ElGamal.
As it has been stated previously, cryptographic hardware is very limited with regard to
the algorithms supported, and traditional ElGamal is not supported. However,
ElGamal relies heavily on the same operation as RSA: ab mod c.
This fact enabled objective of building a prototype for that functionality, but hindered
its performance. It was possible to implement support for ElGamal as a Java Card
Applet, but the performance of this software-based implementation was very low. The
time was very stable, but very high. Each exponentiation would require between 615
and 625 ms. A single card performed on average 500 operations in 309 seconds. Given
its stable behavior, it is estimated that it can perform nearly 5800 operations within an
hour.
In other words, just for the most basic implementation of ElGamal, without enabling
any threshold feature, considering the transmission time of the ciphertext, analyzing
vulnerability against timing or other side channel attacks, and assuming a very
conservative voter turnover rate, 20 cards running in parallel for one hour would be
required to decrypt the votes for a single country-wide Estonian election.
Even for the execution of built-in operations, smart cards (and Java Cards in
particular) are too slow to support the decryption of a big number of ciphertexts.
Result: It is not scalable enough to fulfill the requirements of a nation-wide election.
4.3 Design option 2: Smart Cards with Homomorphic Tallying
Summary: Preprocess the ciphertexts in a more powerful system using homomorphic
tallying techniques. Use smart cards to decrypt only the tally.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2, preprocessing server
Description: The main obstacle identified during the design of a solution involving
smart cards is the amount of decryption operations that are required. Homomorphic
encryption schemes enable certain operations (addition, for instance) on ciphertexts
without decryption, and, specifically, homomorphic tallying is a common example of
how homomorphic addition can be leveraged to produce more complex functionality.
In an additively homomorphic encryption system, there exists an operation ⊗ such that
E(m1)⊗E(m2) = E(m1⊕m2). The addition can be performed repeatedly to obtain the
sum of a set of encrypted values: given a set m of size n, ⊗1≤i≤nE(mi) = E(⊕1≤i≤nmi).
The operation of tallying is not far from the addition of a set. Given a list of candidates
l = {1..L}, a list of votes will be represented by a set v s.t. vi ∈ l. The outcome of the
voting process, T = tally(v) = {T1, ..., TL} is a vector of size L s.t.
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Ti = |{j|1 ≤ j ≤ |v| : vj = li}|. In plain words, the tally is a vector with the count of the
amount of votes for each candidate.
Given an arbitrary vote vi and a partial tally T
′ = {T ′1, ..., T ′L}, the effect of counting vi
into T ′ is to increase the value of T ′vi by 1. However, ballot secrecy demands that the
value of vi remains secret. In other words, the vote must be correctly counted without
disclosing how it was counted.
Homomorphic tallying, first proposed by [28], consists of leveraging the homomorphic
properties of an encryption system to enable tallying without compromising ballot
secrecy. A popular approach for achieving this objective is to encode the tally as a
single integer and define the vote to modify only a specific portion of that integer. As
an example, let L = 3 and the maximum amount of votes for a candidate be
M = 11112 = 15. The tally will be a 4 · 3 = 12-bit long integer initialized in 0:
T= 0000 0000 0000
A vote v will be a bit string as long as T with only one bit on, corresponding to the
LSB of the region of the tally that represents a specific candidate. For instance, a vote
for the candidate 2 will be encoded as:
v = 0000 0001 0000 =16
The addition of both bit arrays will increase the tally by 1:
T= 0000 0000 0000
v = 0000 0001 0000
T + v = 0000 0001 0000
The encoding of the vote can be done efficiently, thus reducing the tallying problem to
the homomorphic addition problem, under the assumption of an honest voter. For most
realistic voting scenarios, however, that assumption does not hold. As a result, a zero
knowledge proof of validity must be calculated for every vote.
As can be seen in the example, there are two variables that determine the size of the
tally representation: the amount of candidates (L) and the maximum amount of votes
(M) that can be cast. In order to prevent integer overflow incidents which would
jeopardize the reliability of the election, the size of T in bits must be:
|T | = L ∗ log2M (2)
These are the bit lengths for different values of L and M .
M
PPPPPPPPPlog2M
L
2 10 16 128 1024
4 2 4 20 32 256 2048
64 6 12 60 96 768 6144
1024 10 20 100 160 1280 10240
16384 14 28 140 224 1792 14336
262144 18 36 180 288 2304 18432
4194304 22 44 220 352 2816 22528
67108864 26 52 260 416 3328 26624
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Considering a reasonable growth margin on top of the numbers in section 3.3, for the
Estonian scenario M = 218 voters and L = 210 = 1024 are sensible dimensions. To
support those magnitudes, each vote would need to be encoded as a 18432-bit integer.
The performance overhead induced by this encoding cannot be disregarded, but could
be accepted if the operations were performed in plaintext in a powerful device.
However, the scheme as a whole is not scalable for several reasons:
1. Homomorphic addition is possible, but not efficient.
2. Common alternatives of homomorphic encryption with high values, such as the
Paillier cryptosystem, need to perform operations modulo ns where n is the
maximum size of the plaintext and s ≥ 2 (note that the s within the exponent is
an arbitrary constant, not to be associated with a secret value). Arithmetic
operations modulo a 184322 =339738624-bits long number are not supported by
any readily available cryptographic hardware, and are slow in software.
3. The kind of zero knowledge proofs required to attest the validity of the vote
encoding, known as range ZKP, are possible [29], but inefficient within a smart
card environment. In particular, they become the kind of bulk operation that
needs to be avoided for a smart card based system.
Result: the scalability of the scheme is severely limited by the number of candidates L
and, to a lesser extent, by the maximum number of votes, specially when verifiability
and smart cards are involved.
Disclaimer: during the later stages of this project we learned about an alternative
approach to homomorphic tallying named vector tallying. Although it still demands
heavily computation-intensive correctness proofs, it is intended to be more efficient than
the basic homomorphic tallying approach and might be refined into a feasible solution
for this problem in the future. The idea is presented in [30] and a recent publication
suggests a performance improvement by generating zero knowledge proofs of correct
mixing of a predefined vector, as opposed to proofs of correct encryption [31].
4.4 Design Option 3: Verifiable Secret Sharing in Smart Cards
Summary: the private key is generated in a verifiable distributed manner. It is only
reconstructed at the time of decryption.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2, preprocessing server
Description: the options 1 and 2 suggest that threshold decryption cannot be
performed efficiently for the input sizes of the Estonian Internet Voting scenario. A
possible result is to reduce the security demands of the smart cards within the general
scenario: to implement only a Distributed Key Generation approach.
This scheme considers the possibility of weakening the security definition of the system
in order to enable its implementation. Specifically, the secret key is built in a
distributed manner, but it needs to be calculated in a centralized manner in order to
perform the decryption. At that point, the key is stored in a new trusted container, and
its security is limited by the security of the container. This container, in practical
terms, could be the computer that reads the smart cards.
A prototype for this functionality was built on the grounds of two previous works that
enable two different aspects of DKG: the first one enables an efficient implementation in
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Java Card with a trusted dealer and the latter discusses how to remove the trusted
dealer.
4.4.1 DKG in Java Card: the CRISES' Report
A report published in 2013 by a Spanish research group known as CRISES [32],
describes the implementation of a threshold variant of ElGamal designed in order to
implement all sensitive operations securely into the JavaCard. The result requires the
existence of a trusted dealer, which is chosen at random amongst the smart cards, but
addresses both at a theoretical and at a practical level some of the most recurrent and
demanding challenges of implementing threshold cryptography on smart cards.
One of the main elements missing in the Java Card API in order to implement custom
cryptographic algorithms is an equivalent to the Java class BigInteger, which enables
support for arbitrary length integers and efficient modular operations. This class is used
extensively in Java cryptographic implementations such as BouncyCastle [16]. As an
essential building block, the CRISES group built a Java Card class called
MutableBigInteger (inspired by a homonymic class in the Java API), which
implements most of the arithmetic operations. The support for modular operations is
enabled by leveraging the support for RSA operations offered by Java Card.
On top of that implementation, the group introduced the functionality required for
their protocol: ElGamal key generation, commitments, secret sharing and ElGamal
encryption/decryption. The group published the code of their prototype on GitHub [33].
Protocol overview
The DKG is documented in detail in the chapter 3 of their report and involves seven
tasks (the VSS task is divided as each part of it needs to produce commitments). The
following description remains informal as a different version of the protocol will be
proposed at the end of this chapter:
1. Election and certification of the electoral board: defines the trustees that
will form the voting authority (i.e. the n shareholders) and the initialization of
the smart cards.
2. Creation of the electoral board: the information about the other parties is
shared. Particularly, the threshold configuration and the digital certificates of the
other smart cards are stored in each of the cards.
3. ElGamal key generation: all the cards get the public ElGamal parameters.
One card is selected randomly as the dealer. The dealer generates an ElGamal key
pair (sk, pk).
4. Verifiable Secret Sharing: The dealer generates the shares of the secret value,
distributes the shares and destroys the value sk.
(a) Phase 1 - Coefficients: generates the coefficients of the Shamir
polynomial. Commits to them.
(b) Phase 2 - Values of x: builds the polynomial and defines the output of the
function getX(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Commits to the values produced.
(c) Phase 3 - Shares: evaluates the polynomial, producing S. Securely
eliminates sk. Commits to the shares.
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5. Share distribution: creates secret authenticated channels between the card of
the dealer and each of the other cards using their digital certificates. Sends one
share to each of the smart cards. Securely eliminates the shares that were
transmitted.
6. Share verification: each smart card decrypts its share and verifies the
commitments associated.
7. Share signing: each smart card signs a commitment to its share and makes the
commitment public.
The expectation of secure deletion of the secret and the shares is the single point of
failure that is not acceptable for this scenario. Since there is no way to prove that the
deletion occurred, it is possible for the dealer smart card to keep the secret
inadvertently, either accidentally (e.g. the card is removed before the deletion is
invoked) or intentionally (e.g. the code is tampered to not remove the secret).
Efficiency results
The CRISES' report includes a benchmark of their protocol, covering the operations
performed on the smart card. Individually, the operations are slow but considered
acceptable: the share generation and distribution is performed within minutes, whereas
the decryption is performed in a matter of seconds.
This result is consistent with the one of the design option 1 presented in section 4.2, in
the sense that decryption is not scalable to the level of a batch operation. The report,
accordingly, remarks that this system needs to be used in the context of homomorphic
or hybrid voting systems, but is not realistic in the scenario of mixnet based e-voting
protocols.
4.4.2 Untrusted Dealer
An approach to remove the need of the trusted dealer is presented in [34]. It is based on
the ElGamal cryptosystem [35] and a VSS variant of Shamir's Secret Sharing. Once the
share generation is finished, the encryption, reconstruction and decryption phases are
essentially unchanged.
The key distribution process requires that each authorized party executes the protocol,
and uses the data published by the other parties in order to complete it. The protocol
definition here is adapted to reflect its execution in a concurrent, potentially distributed
environment. Let A be the list of authorized shareholders and Ai denote a unique
identifier of the i-th shareholder. The function broadcast(m) shares a message m with
all the other parties, whereas send(i,m) shares the message m via a secret
authenticated channel with the shareholder Ai.
The definition takes the parameters p, q, g from the underlying ElGamal scheme and the
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threshold values t, n. The first step in the process is the key generation:
Algorithm 2: PedersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration
input : p, q, g
output : xi, hi
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 xi
$←− Zq;
2 hi ← gxi ;
3 r ← R ; // Set R not specified in the source
4 Ci ←Commitment.Commit(hi, ri);
5 broadcast(Ci)
The key pair generated by Ai must not be influenced by any other value hj(i 6= j). To
ensure that property, each shareholder commits to its own hi before getting access to
hj. Once each shareholder has generated its commitment, the commitments are open
and a shared public key is calculated:
Algorithm 3: PedersenDKG.SharedPublicKeyGeneration
input : hi, C
output : h
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 broadcast(hi, ri);
2 for Aj ∈ A \ Ai do
3 wait(hj, rj) ; // Wait for the other parties to publish their public
key values
4 if Commitment.Open(hj, Cj, rj)=0 then
5 stopAndReport(hj, Cj, rj)
6 h←∏nj=1 hj;
Since all the public shares hi were broadcast, each actor in A obtains the same public
key, which is to be made public also for the voters. The rest of the key generation
protocol is focused on the cooperation necessary to calculate shares for the value of
x =
∑n
i=1 xi such that h = g
x while preserving the (t, n)−threshold properties.
For the next step, each authorized party must execute an independent instance of
Shamir.SecretSharing. The resulting coefficients and shares will be identified by two
indexes: aj,i will describe the j-th coefficient of Ai (with the wildcard a∗,i to identify the
whole set of coefficients of Ai). Likewise, sj,i will describe the j-th share of si. Each
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authorized party continues its procedure by generating shares of their values xi:
Algorithm 4: PedersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationInit
input : xi, g, t, n
output : sj,∗ (the shares received from the other parties)
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 a∗,i, Si ←Shamir.SecretSharing(xi, t, n);
2 for j ← 1 to t− 1 do
3 Fi,j ← gaj,i ;
4 broadcast(Fi,j);
5 for j ← 1 to n do
6 send(j,sj,i) ; // Note that for the step i=j, the share is send to
itself.
The first cycle commits to the coefficients of the secret sharing polynomial. The second
cycle sends a share of the secret xi to each member of A. In other words, Ai has a share
of each of the secrets created for the protocol. If t members of A agree, they can
reconstruct all of the secrets xi. The last part of the protocol adds the last layer of
verifiability and aggregates the shares in order to require one single secret
reconstruction process:
Algorithm 5: PedersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationFinish
input : g, n, si,∗, F, h
output : si. Additionally signs the computed private key h if the key shares
are consistent.
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 for j ← 1 to n do
2 if !verify(gsi,j =
∏t−1
l=0 F
il
j,l) ; // Verify share consistency
3 then
4 reportFailureAndStop();
5 si ←
∑n
j=1 sj,i;
6 publish(SigAi(h))
As originally intended, the result of the process is an ElGamal key pair for which the
secret key is (t, n)−shared. The reconstruction process of the key is the default
Shamir.SecretReconstruction scheme, and the encryption and decryption processes
are the standard ElGamal algorithms.
The PedersenDKG algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 6: PedersenDKG
input : p, q, g, t, n
output : s. Additionally signs the computed private key h if the key shares
are consistent.
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 xi, hi ←PerdersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration(p, q, g);
2 h← PerdersenDKG.SharedPublicKeyGeneration(hi);
3 si,∗, F ←PerdersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationInit(xi, g, t, n);
4 s←PerdersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationFinish(g, n, si,∗, F, h)
Another useful visualization of the algorithm focuses on the use of commitments as
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synchronization points, as the algorithm requires that the commitments of the other
parties are generated (and subsequently correctly open) before continuing its flow:
A1 ... An
C1 Cn Each node creates an independent key pair
Open C∗ commitments
F1,∗ Fn,∗ Each node created a set of t coefficients
Open F∗,∗ commitments
It is important to remark that the definition of PedersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration
uses a generic definition of commitment, whereas the coefficient commitments are
explicitly defined as part of the protocol.
4.4.3 Architecture
Although the notation, the entities and the terminology of the CRISES report and the
Pedersen's DKG scheme differ vastly, it was possible to modify the CRISES source code
to remove the trusted dealer.
A review of the CRISES protocol revealed that the main difference between their
implementation and the scheme proposed by Pedersen was the number of users
performing the key generation process.
Java Card debugging is a slow low level process. The deployment of a minor change
takes minutes and the results are often two byte codes, which might be standardized,
application-dependent or both. It is unsuitable to test by itself cryptographic
functionality. The resulting decision was the design of a brand new Java application
that would communicate with the Java Card only when it was strictly necessary.
The interface Broker was designed to represent a party in a threshold protocol. The
class BasicElGamalJavaBroker extends from it in a simple implementation of
traditional ElGamal.
The second implementation, ThresholdElGamalJavaBroker, implemented the behavior
of an actor Ai within Pedersen's protocol. For the communication between different
brokers, a bulletin board was implemented. A bulletin board B is an abstract concept
present in online voting protocols that contains all the messages exchanged between the
parties. A bulletin board supports the abstract functions append and search, but not
delete or edit.
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Since the nature of the messages in the bulletin board is so diverse, the bulletin board
was divided into a set of subjects, defined in the Enumeration BBT. That way, the
functionality of the bulletin board was defined:
Algorithm 7: BulletinBoard.addMessage
input : BBT tag, Message newMessage
output : none. The message newMessage is now attached to the subject
identified by tag
1 B[tag]← B[tag] ∪ {newMessage}
Algorithm 8: BulletinBoard.getSubject
input : BBT tag
output : subject
1 subject← B[tag]
The reading functionality in B was designed to return all the messages associated with
one tag (e.g. all the messages with the tag PUBLIC_KEY_SHARE_TAG are to be used
together to calculate the public key).
The creation of the bulletin board made it possible to keep track of the communication
between the brokers, since no message can be exchanged between them in any other
way. Different instances of Message were created, out of which SimpleMessage and
SecretMessage are the most important. SimpleMessage contains a byte array and
SecretMessage contains another Message that can only be read by an intended broker.
Whereas for a real scenario SecretMessage would encrypt-and-sign the message, this
implementation focused on functionality and offers no real security to the message.
The final phase of the development involved the creation of the class ThresholdEl-
GamalJavaCardBroker, which ported the key generation part of the
ThresholdElGamal- JavaBroker to the Java Card.
The implementation was tested with a (3, 5)−threshold where one of the Brokers was a
ThresholdElGamalJavaCardBroker and the other 4 ThresholdElGamalJavaBroker.
The implementation succeeded both when the Java Card broker was used to reconstruct
the key and when it contributed only to the creation of the secret.
4.4.4 Performance
As described in the previous sections, the key generation protocol implemented is
essentially similar to the version developed by the CRISES group. The main difference
lies on the amount of cards used to calculate the secret, and since that task can be
performed in parallel in a system designed to provide almost constant time
performance, the total time of the key generation is not likely to increase. The time for
verification of commitments, however, should increase by a factor of n.
Thus, the results provided by the CRISES group for their approach are not likely to
increase by several orders of magnitude. Their results for the trusted dealer approach,
aggregating the result for different key sizes, were:
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Operation Performance range (minutes)
Generation of 5 shares 5.56 to 20.10
Verification of a share 1.14 to 4.26
Encryption of 1 message 0.42 to 1.25
Decryption of 1 message 0.27 to 0.70
Since the performance overhead will occur during the key generation phase and will not
increase by several orders of magnitude, the viability of the process remains intact. The
performance-intensive operations can be performed in advance and will not have
repercussions during the election process.
The current implementation of the system contains a non-verifiable version of the
process. In other words, it does neither calculate nor verify commitments. The
non-verifiable share generation process takes in average 95 seconds to generate 5
3-threshold shares, with an error margin of at most 10 seconds.
4.4.5 Solution Analysis
The solutions 1 and 2 were identified as inviable or insufficient before they were
evaluated in terms of the framework defined in section 4.1. However, this last solution
was implemented and is feasible as long as a non-decryption-intensive voting scheme is
introduced. The next step is to analyze the solution from the security point of view.
- Random number generation: depends on the smart card. Java Card supports two
algorithms, ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM and ALG_SECURE_RANDOM. The Feitian Java Card
supports both, and the implementation makes use of ALG_SECURE_RANDOM.
- Verifiable correctness of the generator: the key generation can be certified in some
Java Cards for standard algorithms. There are no known certifications for smart
card environments that certify ElGamal implementations, or threshold
implementations in particular.
- Encrypted transport: the protocol establishes a secure authenticated channel
between TCBs to exchange the secret shares that can be used to decrypt the
secret.
- Access control: the right to calculate and use a secret share is given in this scheme
by the physical possession of the smart card. A PIN code can be used as a second
factor of authentication.
- The key cannot be used by an unauthorized actor or group: t cards are required to
perform a decryption, reducing the impact of the loss of one card.
- Tampering protection: a share must be consistent with the published
commitments in order to be used, and there are n− t cards that can be used as a
replacement if the secret in one of them is tampered with. After the
reconstruction, the key is exposed.
- Resilience: The system can tolerate up to n− t failures (accidental or intentional)
and resist the collusion of groups of at most t− 1 authorized users. For a fixed
value n of authorized users, the selection of t constitutes a trade-off between
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confidentiality and resiliency. After the key is reconstructed, if the key is
tampered with or destroyed, it can be reconstructed again. However, it can no
longer be considered a shared secret, as it existed in its reconstructed state in a
less secure container.
The protocol does not contemplate the creation of additional shares (in case of
loss or failure, for instance), but it is possible to design it.
- The key can be destroyed irreversibly: the key disposal procedure is not defined by
the protocol. The shares should be deleted from the smart cards and the
reconstructed copy securely deleted from its trusted container.
Result: assuming a correct implementation and the selection of a reliable Java Card
provider with the right supported features, the scheme can resist the collusion of up to
t− 1 authorized parties and the loss of up to n− t shares. After the key reconstruction,
however, the security of the scheme is limited to the security of the trusted container
used to calculate the secret key.
Additional security controls should be added to harden access control, resilience and the
secure deletion of the key.
4.5 Result Comparison
As the design options 1 and 2 were found to be inviable under the conditions
established, it is only worthwhile to compare the design option 3 against the current
HSM approach. The official characteristics of the HSM were summarized at the
beginning of this chapter, whereas the security analysis of the design option 3 was the
subject of section 4.4.5. Since the HSM results are described in terms of the
functionality of the hardware and the suggested option in terms of the key management
framework defined in section 4.1, the following section will summarize the effects of
migrating from an HSM to a smart card based approach.
4.5.1 Unchanged Features
HSMs and smart cards are both hardware implementations designed to execute
cryptographic operations within a hardened environment. It is possible to acquire
hardware with similar FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria security certifications for both
systems, and both are used to support security-critical processes. Likewise, although
the set of specific algorithms is vendor-dependent, the standardization and
compatibility of cryptographic algorithms is high.
4.5.2 New Features
The Java Card scheme introduces a stronger variant of secret sharing that reduces the
reliance on a single point of failure, although it does not remove it entirely. The
technology enables the generation of zero knowledge proofs as well as the
implementation of homomorphic encryption algorithms.
The overall cost of the process is reduced and the resilience of the process is preserved,
if not strengthened, due to the nature of the threshold protocol. Nevertheless, the most
significant feature achieved is flexibility: the possibility of implementing and executing
arbitrary (if limited) protocols is of utmost importance in an environment where the
majority of the most powerful protocols are not readily available.
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4.5.3 Impacted Features
The main feature affected by the Java Card alternative is the performance of
cryptographic operations. As a result, the variety of voting schemes that can be
supported at a nation-wide scale is severely limited.
Other features that can be impacted are tamper evidence and availability, as HSMs are
designed to be heavy duty hardware and smart cards are not.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
This document described the analysis of alternative key management strategies suitable
for the scenario of nation-wide legally binding online voting. The alternatives evaluated
aimed at the use of smart cards as a low cost secure provider of cryptographic
functionalities and key storage. A qualitative framework to evaluate key storage
strategies was defined.
While early results already revealed that cryptographic batch operations are not
feasible on the existent smart card hardware, the work of the CRISES group in 2013
had proven that an implementation of threshold decryption in smart cards is possible.
This document described how that work was extended to remove the figure of the
trusted dealer, although it still needs a trusted party to calculate the secret.
Despite the promising result from the functionality point of view, there is a wide range
of open questions that need to be addressed before their results can be considered for a
practical usage. Some of them build upon the results of the present document, whereas
some constitute orthogonal directions towards the final objective. The final paragraphs
of this document will attempt to identify and classify them.
5.1 Non-standard cryptography and smart card development
Security certifications can be misleading. A smart card certified on FIPS 140-2 may be
designed to be resistant against side channel attacks, but only for the supported
algorithms. The software implementation of unsupported cryptographic primitives may
be ignoring the assumptions on which the security of the smart card is built, and
therefore enabling subtle and dangerous vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, cryptography is a field where peer review is essential to prevent minor
bugs from becoming catastrophic vulnerabilities. However, there are no standardization
attempts or even notation agreements when it comes to functionality for zero knowledge
proofs, commitments and other primitives essential to MPC. This is true even for major
programming languages (where there are a few unmaintained projects), and specially
critical for low level implementations. If every implementation of these protocols must
begin by designing how to encode a share, the applicability of the research in this field
will progress at a very slow rate.
This call for building blocks is even more urgent in the case of Java Card, where even
arithmetic operations must be redefined before implementing any actual functionality.
In fact, the suitability of Java Card as a development platform for cryptographic
functionality should be evaluated. Should the cost in terms of low level thinking, slow
coding rate, learning curve, cryptic debugging and uncertain security expectations be
considered unacceptable for productive scenarios? If that is the case, what would be the
alternative? Is the design of a smart card with native support for these operations a
viable alternative?
5.2 Threshold decryption in online voting scenarios
The security assumption of the voting protocol was weakened in this project to the
point where the key is decentralized until it needs to be calculated for decryption. Since
a scheme with no trusted dealer was implemented, the hardening of that assumption
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can be attempted, for instance by introducing the idea of threshold decryption. Is it
possible to design a voting scheme that satisfies the following requirements?
1. Distributed Key Generation with untrusted dealer
2. Threshold decryption (i.e. without key reconstruction)
3. Execution of critical operations directly on smart cards (or equivalently secure
hardware)
4. Practical for a nation-wide election process (from the results of this document,
this implies that it must not be decryption-intensive)
5. Efficiently verifiable
5.3 The general key management problem
Since key management is mostly a qualitative information security concern at the core
of the eminently mathematical discipline of cryptography, is it possible to quantify the
quality of an information security approach? Can the parameters introduced in the
qualitative framework in this document be weighed to bear different relevance under
different cryptographic scenarios?
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A Notation Summary
A.1 Basic Notation
Symbol Meaning
⊕ Group addition
⊗ Group multiplication
∀ For all
g Group generator
p, q Arbitrary prime numbers
Pr[x] Probability of event x
Zp Modular group of size p
x← y Assign the value y to the variable x
x
$←− X Assign a random value from the set X to the variable x
X \ Y The set X without the elements in Y
x ∈ X The element x is in the set X
x 6∈ X The element x is NOT in the set X
X ⊂ Y The set X is a proper subset of the set Y
X ⊆ Y The set X is a subset of the set Y
A.2 Basic Cryptographic Functions
Symbol Meaning
c Encrypted message
EncA(m) The encryption of the message m with the public key of the user A
h ElGamal public key
k Generic cryptographic key
K Key space. Set of possible values of a key
m Plaintext message
pk Public key
pkA Public key associated to the user A
r Random value
SigA(m) The signature of the message m with the private key of the user A
sk Secret key
skA Secret key associated to the user A
x ElGamal private key
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A.3 Secret Sharing
Symbol Meaning
A Authorized shareholders
Ai i-th authorized shareholder
ai i-th polynomial coefficient
a∗,i Set of polynomial coefficients of Ai
aj,i j-th polynomial coefficient of Ai
C Commitment or set of related commitments
n Total amount of shares generated
t Threshold. Amount of shares required to perform an operation
s Secret value
S Set of n shares of a secret
Si Set of shares of a secret generated by Ai
si i-th share, expressed as a point (xi, yi)
sj,i j-th share generated by Ai, expressed as a point (xj,i, yj,i)
xi x component of si
yi y component of si
A.4 Online Voting
Symbol Meaning
B Bulletin board
Bi Part of the bulletin board corresponding to Vi
l Set of candidates
L Amount of candidates
M Maximum amount of votes possible for a single candidate
T Tally
V Ordered set of voters that voted
Vi Unique id of the i-th voter
v Ordered set of votes
vi Vote of Vi
A.5 Others
Symbol Meaning
srvi i-th server in a set of servers
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B Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAST Carlisle Adams Stafford Tavares
CSPRNG Cryptographically Secure PRNG
CTR CounTeR [encryption operation mode]
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DKG Distributed Key Generation
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EC Elliptic Curve
ECDH EC Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA EC Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES EC Integrated Encryption Scheme
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HSM Hardware Security Module
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest [Algorithm] 5
MPC Multi-Party Computation
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RC2/RC4/RC5 Rivest Cipher 2/4/5
RFC Request For Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman [cryptosystem]
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TCB Trusted Computing Base
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VSS Verifiable Secret Sharing
ZKP Zero Knowledge Proof
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C Basic Building Blocks
This document contains references to several basic cryptographic primitives, such as
encryption, digital signature and commitments. Although they are not the focus of this
work, their definitions are provided for completeness. The security parameters and
security definitions for each of them are unspecified, as they may change for different
scenarios in which they are applied.
C.1 Public Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PK is defined by three algorithms, PK.KeyGeneration,
PK.Encryption, PK.Decryption. Specifically:
PK.KeyGeneration produces a key pair (sk, pk), where sk is secret and pk is
public.
Given a message m, PK.Encryption(pk,m) returns c, an encryption of m that can
only be decrypted by the holder of sk.
Conversely, PK.Decryption(sk, c) = m.
Encryption ensures mainly that only the authorized recipient will read the message.
Specific encryption schemes are designed to support additional security properties. In
this document, PK.Encryption and PK.Decryption are abbreviated as Encpk(m) and
Decsk(c).
C.2 Digital Signature
PK can be extended to support integrity by defining two additional algorithms: PK.Sign
and PK.Verify:
PK.Sign(sk,m) produces the signature sig of the hash value of m.
PK.Verify(pk,m, sig) returns 1 iff sig is a valid signature of the message m by
the owner of sk.
A digital signature is produced to certify the authenticity and integrity of m.
C.3 ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal is a public key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm assumption,
often used as the basic scheme for more complex schemes (including homomorphic and
threshold schemes). It is defined for both prime integer and elliptic curve groups. The
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integer version is defined as follows (only key generation, encryption and decryption are
relevant for the current document. Signature generation and verification is out of scope):
Algorithm 9: ElGamal.KeyGeneration
input : q, g
output: sk, pk
1 x
$←− Zq;
2 h← gx;
3 sk, pk ← x, h;
Algorithm 10: ElGamal.Encryption
input : q, g, pk,m ∈ Zq
output: c
1 r
$←− Zq;
2 c1 ← gr;
3 c2 ← m · pkr;
4 c← (c1, c2)
Algorithm 11: ElGamal.Decryption
input : q, g, sk, c
output: m
1 m← c2 · c−sk1
C.4 Commitments
In MPC protocols, a threat model known as the malicious model assumes that all
parties can misbehave by deviating from a protocol. One of these malicious behaviors
consists of changing their output according to the output of the other parties. In
scenarios where that situation is not desirable, each party must commit to a value
before they are revealed.
A Commitment then has three phases: Commitment.KeyGeneration generates a public
key pk. Commitment.Commitpk(m, r) produces a value C that commits to a message m
and takes a random value r. Commitment.Openpk takes a tuple (m,C, r) and returns 1
iff C =Commitment.Commitpk(m, r) and 0 otherwise. In other words, it verifies if the
commitment is valid for the claimed value of m.
There are three security properties for a commitment:
- Completeness: it is well defined for every possible input.
- [Computationally] Hiding: the commitment C does not leak information about
the value m to a [polynomial] adversary.
- Binding: A commitment cannot be opened for a value m′ 6= m.
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